Andrew Skinner (2000)

Private Law Children

Andrew specialises in all areas of law relating to Children. Within private law proceedings he has extensive experience dealing with cases across the spectrum; from serious violence cases (including murder); cases with an international element including abduction and child abuse; residence and specific issue applications to the most straightforward contact disputes. Whatever the case it is approached with the same diligence; the aim being to secure the best possible outcome for the client with the minimum of distress.

Public Law Children

Andrew also undertakes all forms of public law work. He accepts instructions from Local Authorities but is best known for his work on behalf of families and Guardians on behalf of the children. Many acknowledge that within this field all clients, though parents in particular, are usually under great emotional strain. Andrew strives to put all at ease during all stages of the litigation and is known to be "user friendly", whilst being straight talking when required!

Ancillary Relief

Andrew's practice in this field ranges from the high value case to the low asset "needs based" case. Each is met with the same attention to detail, acknowledging that the client is usually in a highly emotional state but at the same time not shirking from giving sound practical advice at all times.

Cohabitation Law

In addition to the problems for married couples, Andrew receives instructions on behalf of cohabitants, civil partners, co-owners and family members in relation to all areas of dispute.

Injunctions

Andrew undertakes all areas under the Family Law Act 1996 as amended by the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004.

Civil - Personal Injury & Chancery

Andrew still accepts instructions in civil law cases ranging including personal injury and contract law.

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Removal From The Jurisdiction: Still A Payne?

...Perhaps not! This topic has been the focus of much academic and legal debate in recent times. In timely fashion the Court of Appeal handed down the decision of MK v CK [2011] EWCA Civ 793 on 7 July 2011. The case considered the significance of the well-known decision of Payne v Payne (2001) EWCA Civ 166. The Appellant father appealed against a decision allowing the mother to relocate with the two children to Canada. The children were aged four and two; the mother was of Canadian origin. Following their divorce a shared residence order was made allowing the children to spend five nights with the father and nine nights with the mother every 14 days. The mother applied for leave to remove, citing she felt isolated and stressed and wished to return to Canada to live with her parents and for family support. The father contested on the basis of his commitment to the children and the shared residence situation. A CAFCASS report recommended the application be refused and that the balance came down against the move. The judge however rejected the recommendation and referred to the effect that such refusal would have on the mother, directing herself to the guidance set out in Payne.

The Court of Appeal found for the father. In the first instance there was a clear recommendation from CAFCASS which the judge had rejected and had offered no real analysis why.

Thorpe LJ set out that as the father was providing much care and input into the children’s lives the judge should have considered Re Y (Leave to Remove from Jurisdiction) [2004] 2 FLR 330 rather than Payne. The only principle to be extracted from Payne was the paramountcy principle. All the rest was guidance as to factors to be weighed in search of the welfare paramountcy. The Payne guidance was given on the basis that the applicant was the primary carer. It was the practical arrangements for sharing the burden of care between two equally committed carers which was significant, rather than the label "shared residence". Where each was providing a more or less equal proportion and one sought to locate externally, the approach which was suggested in Payne should not be utilised; the judge should instead exercise his discretion to grant or refuse the application by applying the statutory checklist in the Children Act 1989, s1(3). The only authentic principle in relocation authorities was that the child’s welfare was the Court’s paramount consideration.

So what of non-shared residence cases? Even where the case concerned a true primary carer, there was no presumption that the reasonable relocation plans of that carer would be facilitated. When a relocation application fell to be determined, all the facts needed to be considered, Payne and Re Y considered.

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The Credit Crunch A Dramatic Subsequent Event?

Any ancillary relief practitioners who have any clients left of any substantial wealth in this economic climate may have pondered the conundrum of what might happen if the recession causes a marked fall in the fortunes of one party to a compromise agreement. Would this be a Barder event? (Barder v Caluori [1988] AC 20 HL)

Guidance was given last month by the Court of Appeal decision of Myerson v Myerson [2009] EWCA Civ 282, in which the Appellant Husband appealed the order giving effect to the compromise agreement. Husband was a successful fund manager of a quoted company and its executive chairman. At the FDR the assets stood at £25.8million (substantially in shares of the company). It was agreed that Wife would receive £11million (43%) in instalments and Husband, £14.5million (57%). Wife would receive £9.5million in cash and the balance by transfer of a property. The first instalment of £7million was duly paid. At the date of compromise, the Husband's shares were valued at £2.99p each - worth £15million to the Husband. A year later the shares were only worth 27.5p each. The global financial crisis and thus the fall in his share values led the Husband to appeal; arguing the fall in value was a dramatic subsequent event rendering the order unfair and unworkable. Due to the drop, the assets now stood at £12.7million and if implemented as compromised meant the Husband would now receive 14% and the Wife, 86%.

The Court of Appeal rejected the appeal. The natural processes of price fluctuation were deemed not to be a Barder event. The Husband had agreed an asset division choosing his assets to be in his shares; his decision could in effect have led to an increase in values, that it did not did not constitute his right to re-open the bargain. Whilst we all know each case turns on its own facts this may be a salutary reminder to think creatively when drafting compromise agreements. If anyone has a similar case, one tip seems to emerge: Think of paying large lump sums by instalments, they are capable of variation via s31(2)(d), Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, and may be the only source of clawing something back by the Husband in the instant case!

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