Lifting The Veil Of Incorporation

By · 1 July 2013 · 9 min read

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Important lessons for civil and family lawyers from the Supreme Court’s decision in Petrodel

The widely reported case of Prest v Petrodel Resources [2013] UKSC 34 contains important material which goes beyond the application of the law of family finances. At base, the Supreme Court had the difficult task of squaring the circle of reconciling over a hundred years of company law since Salomon v Salomon (which may be regarded as the cornerstone of British commerce) with the justice of Mrs Prest’s case and the Court’s reluctance to allow dishonest directors to use their companies to thumb their nose at matrimonial awards.

The question for the Supreme Court was:

Whether it is open to the court in ancillary relief proceedings to treat the assets of a company of which a spouse is the sole controller as being assets to which that spouse is ‘entitled’ for the purposes of s 24(1)(a) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.

The Facts on appeal to the Supreme Court were as follows:

The appellant wife brought financial proceedings ancillary to her divorce from her husband Michael Prest. The husband was ordered to pay a lump sum of £17.5m to the wife, which he has (still) not paid. The respondents were all Isle of Man companies under the control of the husband. The wife obtained an order that real property held by the respondent companies should be transferred to her so as to reduce the lump sum order.

The respondents successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal against that order.

The husband was an extremely wealthy man due to his substantial ownership of a number of companies which themselves owned a very extensive property portfolio of luxury houses (including the matrimonial home) and other assets in various locations across the world.  The husband was running all family expenditure through these companies.

In 2011 the wife succeeded in convincing the Judge that in reality, the properties were owned, managed and effectively therefore the property of her husband. He was ordered to transfer over 17 million pounds worth of the property to her.

The problem for Mrs Prest was that having been awarded such a large sum of money, she was unable to enforce the order (apart from in respect of the family home which the trial judge found as a fact was being held on trust for the family) because all of the family wealth was tied up in offshore companies, including Petrodel Resources Limited. The Court never managed to get to the bottom of the beneficial ownership of the shares because the husband refused to cooperate with the Court, so the trial Judge had looked straight through the companies to the only director - Mr Prest - and assumed that he was actually the beneficial owner of the underlying assets of the company. Mr Justice Moylan thought that the provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act gave him the power to do that.

The Court of Appeal disagreed, and in emphatic terms. Lord Justice Patten said I wish particularly to support Rimer LJ's criticism of the dicta in Nicholas v Nicholas [1984] FLR 285 and his view that these cannot be relied upon as a correct statement of the law following the decision of this court in Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433 . They have led judges of the Family Division to adopt and develop an approach to company owned assets in ancillary relief applications which amounts almost to a separate system of legal rules unaffected by the relevant principles of English property and company law. That must now cease.

In the Court’s view, it was axiomatic that the assets of a company do not belong to their shareholders or directors. They belong to the company. The shareholders merely own the shares.

Mrs Prest’s victory in the Supreme court has been hailed in some sections of the press as restoring London to being the divorce capital of the world for wealthy wives, and a setback for business, but in reality it was nothing of the kind. Whilst Mrs Prest was successful in her appeal, almost everything said by the Court of Appeal remained untouched. All of her arguments in front of their lordships failed save one about the assets being held upon resulting trust, which had not been successfully pursued in the first place. In the leading judgment of Lord Sumption, a retrospective analysis of the facts was carried out, and the Court held that actually, when one looked at the source of the company’s assets (some of which had been acquired by the company from Mr Prest for £1), this was all very suspicious and since he (and the company) had deliberately refused to give any explanation about these dealings, the Court was entitled to assume that the assets were actually held upon trust for him personally.

Thus did the Supreme Court perform the tricky task of reconciling 100 years of company law since Salomon v Salomon with the obvious injustice of letting Mr Prest get away with his dishonest dealing.

The general law of lifting the veil of incorporation however took a battering. Lord Sumption made clear that the only basis of looking behind the corporate identity was that the basis of all legal reasoning is that people must deal honestly. Where there is fraud the Courts will not allow dishonest dealing to defeat the claim. Only fraud and agency and (in the almost unique factual circumstances of Petrodel assets impliedly held on trust by the company) could lead to a claim against the operator of a company personally, and the doctrine of lifting the veil will only be of any application

"where a person who is under an existing legal obligation deliberately evades responsibility by interposing a company under his control".

This is what happened in two of the previous leading cases, Gilford Motor Co v Horne1 and Jones v Lipman2. Mr Horne tried to get out of a restrictive covenant by forming a company to engage his services in competition with his previous business, and Mr Lipman sold his property to his own company to try to avoid the consequences of an agreed sale to the Claimant. The only other type of case is where the company can truly be said to be the agent of its directors, as in the (almost one-off) case of Wallersteiner v Moir3. Mr Wallersteiner’s companies were held by Lord Denning to be mere puppets for his personal activities and were set up to avoid personal liability. In each of these cases the company was in effect set up for a nefarious purpose.

Lord Neuberger in Petrodel went further. He said this

The history of the doctrine over 80 years of its putative life (taking Gilford Motor as the starting point) is, therefore, at least as I see it, a series of

decisions, each of which can be put into one of three categories, namely:

i. Decisions in which it was assumed that the doctrine existed, but it was rightly concluded that it did not apply on the facts;

ii. Decisions in which it was assumed that the doctrine existed, and it was wrongly concluded that it applied on the facts;

iii. Decisions in which it was assumed that the doctrine existed and it was applied to the facts, but where the result could have been arrived at on some other, conventional, legal basis, and therefore it was wrongly concluded that it applied (see para 62 above).

At one stage it looked as though he was going to re-write the law:

I was initially strongly attracted by the argument that we should decide that a supposed doctrine, which is controversial and uncertain, and which, on analysis, appears never to have been invoked successfully and appropriately in its 80 years of supposed existence, should be given its quietus. Such a decision would render the law much clearer than it is now, and in a number of cases it would reduce complications and costs: whenever the doctrine is really needed, it never seems to apply.

He drew back from this, and concluded (with Lady Hale and Lord Wilson) that

....it would be wrong to discard a doctrine which, while it has been criticised by judges and academics, has been generally assumed to exist in all common law jurisdictions, and represents a potentially valuable judicial tool to undo wrongdoing in some cases, where no other principle is available. Accordingly, provided that it is possible to discern or identify an approach to piercing the corporate veil, which accords with normal legal principles, reflects previous judicial reasoning (so far as it can be discerned and reconciled), and represents a practical solution (which hopefully will avoid the problems summarised in para 75 above), I believe that it would be right to adopt it as a definition of the doctrine.

Having read what Lord Sumption says in his judgment, especially in paras 17, 18, 27, 28, 34 and 35, I am persuaded by his formulation in para 35, namely that the doctrine should only be invoked where "a person is under an existing legal obligation or liability or subject to an existing legal restriction which he deliberately evades or whose enforcement he deliberately frustrates by interposing a company under his control".

We may conclude therefore that as the law now stands, fraud unravels everything, and the corporate veil may be lifted in very limited circumstances, but only where a person who is under an existing legal obligation uses a company in dishonest circumstances to avoid his obligations such that the Court is entitled to conclude that the company is a sham and is no more than his creature or puppet and/or that the assets of that company truly belong to him and not the company. It remains to be seen whether any of the residual class of cases mentioned by several of the judges will lead to an extension of the very narrow doctrine now laid down by the Supreme Court.

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